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Higher Education and Science in Brazil: A Walk toward the Cliff?

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In Brazil, decisions made by the federal government have historically determined the development of higher education, science, technology, and innovation, given its central role in terms of policy, funding, and regulation. Since the 1930s, when the first federal and state universities were created, there has been a prevailing and general understanding among national authorities that the development of a sovereign nation depends on progressive investments in the education of human resources and the promotion of science. Direct efforts to consolidate a national policy for science date back to the postwar period, when the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Level Personnel (Capes) and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) were founded.

Both public universities and funding agencies became fundamental to the country's development, to the extent that today, it would be impossible to imagine that Brazil could meet critical national demands of social and economic growth without the participation of these institutions. Given this context, the recent declarations by President Jair Bolsonaro since assuming office in January 2019 and measures enacted or proposed by his government have caused great concern and created considerable confusion. This article summarizes the main events that have taken place and possible implications for the future.

UNCERTAINTY, CONTROVERSIES, AND PUSHBACKS

From January to March 2019, the ministry of education under Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez suffered from an "internal war," resulting in great instability. In regard to higher education, Vélez Rodríguez asserted that "the idea of university for all people does not exist. Universities should be reserved for an intellectual elite." This was considered particularly offensive as enrollment in higher education in Brazil is still the privilege of the elite: according to the OECD's Education at Glance 2018, fewer than 20 percent of the segment of the population between the ages of 25

and 34 hold a university degree. His attitude also reversed recent attempts to broaden access and democratize public higher education.

In March 2019, a surprising cut of 42 percent of the budget of the ministry of science, technology, innovation, and communications was announced—while the current government reached the presidency promising increased investments in science, technology, and innovation (ST&I) from the current 1.5 percent of the GDP to 3 percent, which would be comparable to the European Union. The decision also provoked concern because of its harmful consequences for both universities and society at large. Universities depend on the resources of federally funded public agencies to finance research. Disrupting the flow of resources will prevent the country from addressing many of its social and economic challenges. In addition, strategic sectors such as health, energy, and agriculture will be severely affected if such constraints are not reconsidered.

A month after taking office, he announced that three federal universities—Brasília (UnB), Fluminense (UFF), and Bahia (UFBA)—would face budget cuts for allegedly promoting turmoil and for poor academic performance.

PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS (HEIs) AS MAIN TARGETS

In April 2019, economist Abraham Weintraub replaced Véllez Rodrigues at the ministry of education. Immediately following his appointment, President Bolsonaro announced on Twitter that Minister Weintraub was considering cuts to investments in schools of philosophy and sociology, indicating his preference “to focus on fields that generate an immediate return to the taxpayer such as veterinary medicine, engineering, and medicine.” This dismissal of humanities and social sciences reflects the president’s ideological position and his hostility toward public universities and academics, a threat not only to the operation of these institutions, but also to academic freedom.

A month after taking office, he announced that three federal universities—Brasília (UnB), Fluminense (UFF), and Bahia (UFBA)—would face budget cuts for allegedly promoting turmoil and for poor academic performance. According to Weintraub, “homework needs to be done: scientific publishing, up-to-date assessments, good positions in rankings.” Ironically, these three institutions are among

the best in Brazil according to national rankings measuring teaching quality and international rankings measuring research productivity, raising doubts about the actual motivations behind his decision. Budget constraints quickly spread to the entire federal system. If this measure materializes, all federal universities and institutes will face a 30 percent cut in their 2019 operational budgets, putting into question their viability in the second semester.

In addition to the cuts themselves, what was very disturbing was the effort to minimize public criticism. In a weird attempt to explain the measure, the minister stated that the cut represents “only” 3.5 percent of the federal higher education budget. As pensions and salaries cannot be cut, the proposed budget reductions will have an even more significant impact on daily operations of universities. Given what public HEIs represent for Brazil, these cuts effectively “cut the government’s own throat.”

Additional concern arose in May 2019, when Capes stopped more than 3,000 scholarships for graduate students without prior notice. The agency stated that these were only cuts to “idle” scholarships, which did not make sense. One-third of those scholarships were restored after protests from the universities. However, in June 2019, Capes changed the criteria for providing graduate programs with scholarships, which resulted in an additional cut of 2,500 scholarships.

Also, in June 2019, an intervention raised concerns about the autonomy of public universities. For the first time in two decades, the ministry of education broke with the tradition of approving the appointment of a rector who won an election held by the university community.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION

Bolsonaro’s agenda for higher education will also probably affect attempts to internationalize the system through its impact on at least three important national programs: the *Programa Doutorado-Sanduiche no Exterior* (Capes–PDSE), which funds international mobility for doctoral researchers; the *Programa Institucional de Internacionalização* (Capes–PrInt), which supports internationalization at HEIs; and the *Programa Idiomas sem Fronteiras* (IsF), which promotes foreign language capacity among university communities.

Finally, the 30 percent budget cut in the federal system will probably affect South–South and regional cooperation. While national programs for internationalization have mostly focused on the United States and Europe, there are important initiatives that have been financed through institutional budgets.

TRUTHS THAT NEED TO BE TOLD AND EFFORTS OF RESISTANCE

Government criticism against Brazilian higher education is not substantiated. For example, the president claims that public HEIs are not productive—yet, while they represent

only 12.1 percent of the national system, they are responsible for 95 percent of national research productivity, and their social role goes beyond research to reach Brazilian society in many important ways. Another unproven assertion is that public universities are populated with “leftists” and “Marxists,” while these institutions actually reflect broader society in terms of political positions.

Finally, even though public universities, traditionally, have been elitist, they have become more democratic in recent years. For example, a 2018 Survey of the Socioeconomic Profile of Students at Federal HEIs shows that 70 percent of undergraduate students at these institutions come from families with a monthly income of up to R\$1,500 (about US\$370). There are also quotas for graduates of public high schools and minority groups that contribute to diversity and help curb the country’s great social inequality.

Although the allegations of the president and his minister of education and the austerity measures they propose are met with public disapproval and attract international attention and protest, we believe that these are just initial steps toward a potential disaster for science and higher education in Brazil. ■

“More with Less” in Higher Education in Mexico

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After two attempts to win the presidency, Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected president of Mexico for the 2018–2024 term. His higher education plan corresponds to what could be defined as a neopopulist agenda. The purpose of this article is to discuss the concept of neopopulism, compare this agenda with those of other neopopulist governments in Latin America, and share concerns on the future of higher education in Mexico.

NEOPULISM AND HIGHER EDUCATION

The concept of neopopulism has been used by political scientists, sociologists, and historians to describe govern-

ments based on regimes led by charismatic leaders; the development of social policies aiming to expand a strong popular support base providing legitimacy for governmental projects; the erosion and even the destruction of political and legal counterparts and of check and balance systems that may oppose presidential decisions; the spread of distrust against civil and nongovernmental organizations; and attacks against individuals, groups, and a free press that criticize the government.

With regard to education, typical neopopulist government policies in Latin America lead to a massification of educational services at all levels; the expansion of scholarships and individual subsidies provided by the government; the establishment of affirmative action measures in favor of the most vulnerable populations; and disregard for international evaluations and standardized tests. In sum, under such regimes, quantity is favored over quality. The two main higher education policy instruments of neopopulist governments are massive numbers of scholarships and enrollment growth. Two typical examples are programs established in Brazil and Argentina.

Lula da Silva, president of Brazil from 2003 to 2011, started the University for All program (known by its Portuguese acronym “ProUni”), subsidizing students enrolled at private universities. Dilma Rousseff, president from 2011 to 2016, continued this program and added two components: Financial Aid and Funding for Higher Education Students (FIES). At the end of these two governmental periods, the programs had reached 2.5 million students. In addition, the Support Program for Restructuring and Expanding Plans of Federal Universities (Reuni) created 30 new federal institutes and 25 university campuses.

In Argentina, during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (from 2007 to 2015), the Support for Argentinian Students Program (known by its Spanish acronym PROGRESAR) gave financial support to students to keep them in school or provide them with vocational training. Approximately 320,000 higher education students received this benefit. Besides this program, 18 new national universities were established, in addition to five provincial universities. Similar programs were introduced in Ecuador under Rafael Correa (from 2007 to 2017) and in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (from 1999 to 2013) and deserve to be studied more closely.

In Argentina and Brazil, the difficulties in solving the economic crisis and cases of corruption explain in many ways the electoral victory of right-wing political parties. Mauricio Macri was elected president in 2015 in Argentina, and in Brazil, Michel Temer was elected president in 2016, followed by Jair Bolsonaro in 2019. Macri’s government carried on some of the programs established by the Kirchner administration while reducing public expenditures in

higher education, science, and technology and attempting to increase the share of private investment. In Brazil, Temer did not cancel all the programs established by da Silva and Rousseff, but he reduced public expenditures. Under the government of Bolsonaro, however, more dramatic changes are taking place with budget cuts to higher education and scientific research and restrictions to university autonomy.

NEW AGENDA

Following some of these trends, in Mexico, during his campaign, López Obrador proposed removing examinations from higher education selection processes, establishing free education for all and creating scholarships for those in greatest need. He also announced that his government will open 100 new universities (“Benito Juárez García”), which will offer curricula tailored to local development needs, while providing educational opportunities to the most disadvantaged youth in the poorest regions of Mexico. The project has been allocated a budget of one billion pesos (US\$52.6 million).

The two main higher education policy instruments of neopopulist governments are massive numbers of scholarships and enrollment growth.

EARLY SETBACKS AND CRITICISM

In August 2018, López Obrador announced before the National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions (ANUIES) that, if elected, he would respect public spending for higher education institutions (in Mexico, more than 90 percent of the public higher education budget comes from government subsidies). Yet, the drafted budget proposal of November 2018 included a 32 percent cut to the sector that resonated with new austerity policies, but was concerning for universities. The sector halted the threat, at least in part. The subsidy for autonomous public universities was corrected to match the 2018 funding, with an increase equivalent to that year’s inflation; all other public higher education institutions (those controlled by the central educational authority) suffered cuts, and so-called “extraordinary funds” (public funding allocated through competitive processes) were reduced. The total expenditure reduction for higher education in 2019 reached 1.7 billion pesos (US\$90.3 million), which, taking inflation into consideration, represents a decrease of 6.2 percent.

REGULATORY REFORM: NEW GROUNDS FOR DISPUTE

Party representatives in Congress were forced to revise and amend the president’s constitutional reform initiative presented on December 12, 2018. The proposal eliminated the autonomy of universities. Despite a ruling parliamentary majority, legislators sought a consensual solution, which meant rewriting almost every aspect included in the initiative. Not only does the reform reinstate university autonomy, it confirms the state’s obligation to provide public institutions with sufficient enrollment capacity for students meeting entrance requirements. Also, it guarantees sufficient fiscal funding to safeguard the principle of free and compulsory education.

MORE WITH LESS?

Mexico’s higher education system has 4.3 million students (66.5 percent in public institutions and 33.5 percent in private institutions), which represents 39 percent of the 18–22 age group. The López Obrador government has set as a target to offer all high school graduates access to higher education by 2024. This goal requires 1.9 million new enrollment openings, which represents an average of 300,000 new spaces per year. To meet this ambitious target, the system would reach a gross coverage of over 55 percent of the corresponding age group. Considering the growth rate of 150,000 newly enrolled higher education students per year, doubling this effort appears to be an insurmountable task in a context of stable or decreasing financial resources for the sector. So far, the government has not outlined any clear strategy to achieve this goal. Even if Benito Juárez García universities operated at capacity, they would barely cover 2 percent of the national higher education enrollment.

Finally, despite the opposition’s victory in limiting the government’s proposed change, the outlook for higher education remains bleak. Strategically focusing resources on student scholarships while limiting funding to higher education institutions, postgraduate studies, and research, as well as programs promoting technology development, innovation, and international cooperation could be a sentence of death for these activities. In a time of neopopulism, higher education in Mexico seems unable to sustain an acceptable level of competitiveness and quality. ■

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Global Student and Talent Flows: Reexamining the Brain Drain Equation

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The global movement of postsecondary students remains a remarkably unidirectional phenomenon: students from the developing world, or Global South, take their knowledge and talent to the developed world, or Global North. Eight of the top 10 host countries are all located in the developed world and attract approximately 60 percent of the world's five million mobile students. As sending countries, China and India alone account for a quarter of the world's mobile students. At the same time, the rise of new and nontraditional destinations (e.g., China); intraregional mobility; and the growth of South–South mobility cannot be ignored.

Despite these newer developments, outbound mobility from both China and India remains high, numerically and in terms of quality: in 2017, 869,387 students from China and 306,000 from India were studying abroad. While these large absolute numbers represent a very small proportion of the college-age cohort in both countries—1 percent for China and 0.3 percent for India—these low proportions mask the human capital potential and “quality” of the students that leave to go abroad. Quality can be subjective, but one proxy is to examine what Indian and Chinese students are studying overseas, with higher levels of education and certain fields of study associated with greater gains for receiving countries and economies. In the United States, for example, almost half of all Indian students are enrolled at the graduate level and in the STEM fields (81 percent). As for Chinese students in the United States, while undergraduates now outnumber graduate students, 36 percent are nevertheless pursuing master's and doctoral degrees.

REVISITING THE BRAIN DRAIN ISSUE

In the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of “brain drain” was front and center and was even described as a form of neocolonialism. By the twenty-first century, the discourse had shifted to “brain circulation” or even “brain gain.” It was widely argued that the loss of human capital by sending countries had been replaced by a balanced exchange of knowledge; long-term international partnerships between equal play-

ers; and high economic contributions of emigrants to their home countries in the form of remittances. Yet current estimates of immigrant and emigrant populations show that most immigrants are heavily clustered in the developed world, while emigrants come mainly from developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Evidence on “stay rates” and “return rates” suggests that a very large proportion of students from developing countries continue to immigrate to their host country, and regions like Africa continue to experience a significant loss of human capital through student mobility. In 2017, in the United States alone, almost 90 percent of Indian doctoral students and 83 percent of Chinese doctoral students indicated their interest in remaining in the United States after their studies. Additionally, 80 percent of international doctorate recipients in STEM fields with definite postgraduation plans reported that their future employment was in the United States.

WHAT SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES CAN DO

Solutions for balancing the knowledge equation between sending and receiving countries require an understanding that the fundamental motivations of international students from the developing world are different from those from developed countries. Take the case of Indian students: their primary motivations for studying in the West are not the pursuit of cultural exchange or the desire to learn a foreign language. Rather, their considerations are more pragmatic, driven by the insufficient capacity of high-quality Indian

The field of student mobility today is going through a period of reflection and stocktaking, primarily due to an altered political and social landscape.

institutions and their desire for professional advancement. This fits within both the “constrained-schooling” and the “migration-for-employment” hypotheses. On the other hand, student flows between developed countries—such as between Europe and the United States—are often pursued for reasons such as mutual and cultural exchange, science diplomacy, and the overall Western philosophy of broadening one's perspectives.

Acknowledging the students' motivations, sending and receiving countries can play a role in mitigating the current imbalance, both at the policy and at the institutional levels. Ziguras and Gribble offer a three-part framework for home or sending countries: retention, return, and engagement. Retention approaches aim to provide sufficient and

high-quality higher education locally, to prevent high levels of student migration in the first place. This is the sort of recent expansion and capacity building seen in both China and India. Second, countries are also offering incentives for their foreign-educated talent to return home; one analysis suggests that there are at least 18 countries with programs designed to attract expatriates. The third group of engagement and network strategies is based on the recognition that highly educated and qualified individuals settled overseas can be engaged through diaspora networks and other initiatives that may ultimately benefit their home country and allow them to contribute, albeit from a distance.

What can receiving countries do? First, at the national level, scholarships offered by host countries are an enduring mechanism to increase access not only for students from poorer countries, but also for marginalized and underrepresented students within those countries—such scholarships are now being monitored through target 4.b of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Second, institutions should not only diversify the countries from which they recruit international students, but should also pay more attention to how they can increase access for potential international students who might not have the means or know-how to access a global education opportunity. Finally, more can be done at the institutional and national levels in major destination countries, to foster international networks and collaborations that enable their international students and immigrant/diaspora faculty to connect with their peers in their home countries.

The field of student mobility today is going through a period of reflection and stocktaking, primarily due to an altered political and social landscape. It is therefore timely to revisit and examine the fundamental ethics, assumptions, and power dynamics that underpin student mobility: how do we ensure that the mobility of students and talent is based on principles of access, equity, and inclusiveness, both at the student level and at the national level? The SDGs have also brought a renewed focus to these issues. Lastly, there are some key gaps in data and knowledge that also need to be addressed. Not enough is known about the socioeconomic background of students who participate in a mobility experience. More concrete measurements are needed of which type of students leave their countries and how this impacts the future talent pools of both home and host countries. And given that there will always be larger outflows of students and talent from the Global South, we need to develop more meaningful and nuanced measures of how skilled immigrants and diaspora communities continue to contribute to their home countries through fostering international collaborations and networks—multiplier effects

that go beyond simplistic (albeit critical) financial measures such as remittances. ■

Rankings and the Public Good Role of Higher Education

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One of the most prominent issues of public and political concern today is the extent to which universities contribute to the public good. Universities have historically had a close relationship with the city and country of their founding. Yet, today, they are often considered part of the elite. Student learning and graduate outcomes are often discounted in preference to pursuing global reputation.

Unequal distribution of societal goods has spurred a deep sense of grievance as evidenced by recent elections and political turmoil around the world. The recent scandal in the United States about financial payments to enable back-door entry to elite universities highlights intensifying social stratification while also raising fundamental questions about the role and responsibilities of universities. These issues are framing the background around increased attention and monitoring of universities. This has placed them under pressure to contribute more to their communities and regions, work with business and civil society, and demonstrate how well they do this.

Rankings have portrayed themselves as promoting greater public information and disclosure, comparing performance internationally to inform students/parents, governments, and the wider public. But too often, rankings measure benefits gained from accumulated public and/or private wealth and investment over decades if not centuries. Their choice of indicators cherish the benefits of attracting high achieving/high socioeconomic students who graduate on time and go on to have successful careers. Excellence is measured in terms of achievements of individual universities rather than public good to society collectively. These factors are reproduced in the indicators that rankings use and popularize.

RANKINGS AND SOCIETAL IMPACT

Aiming to respond to criticism and broaden their appeal—and their product range—rankings have begun to measure universities' societal commitment. *Times Higher Education* (THE) and QS have historically measured society engagement in terms of research collaboration or third-party/industry earned income. This is interpreted as a proxy for knowledge transfer and relies entirely on institutional data. ARWU uses traditional research indicators and has not strayed from this approach. In contrast, U-Multirank has always used a broader range of indicators. Regional engagement is measured as student internships, graduate employment, and engagement with regional organizations, while knowledge transfer is measured as collaboration with industry, patents/spinoffs, and copublications with industry. It also uses institutional data, and switches between numbers and percentages. Greenmetric World University Ranking was launched in 2010. Managed by Universitas Indonesia, it compares “the commitment of universities towards going green and promoting sustainable operation.” It suffers from the shortcomings of institutional data, but in the era of increased public awareness of climate change, it has begun to gain some traction. Not surprisingly, *THE* and QS are also embracing societal impact.

The European Union has sponsored several initiatives seeking to capture engagement with/impact on civil society.

QS includes social responsibility within its QS Stars Ranking. It assesses how far a university takes its obligations to society seriously by supporting the local community and environment awareness. Indicators include community investment and development, charity work and disaster relief, regional human capital, and environmental impact. The first two groupings measure commitment in terms of financial contributions of 1 percent of turnover or US\$2 million; the latter two include student recruitment and graduate employment in the region, and sustainability actions. *THE* launched its University Impact Ranking in April 2019 to great fanfare. It measures activity aligned with the 11 of the 17 UN Sustainability Development Goals (SDGs). Universities must provide data for SDG No. 17—collaboration with other countries, promotion of best practices, and the publication of data—plus at least three other SDGs of their choice. This enables universities to differentiate themselves and play to their strengths. Each SDG field

includes a myriad indicators, but research activity accounts for 27 percent in each of them. This makes it difficult for new/young or nonresearch universities to make an impact. With the exception of research data from Elsevier, universities provide all the evidence and examples. Not only is this a lot of work but, sad to say, institutional data or commentary is not reliable. Some 556 institutions submitted data on one or more of the SDGs, and 141 institutions (25 percent) submitted data on the 11 SDGs that feature in the ranking.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

There are other less familiar rankings, plus a growing number of government efforts, that are seeking and displaying comparative information around public good. Most notable is the *Washington Monthly's* College Guide and Rankings, which adapts a JFK saying: “While other guides ask what colleges can do for students, we ask what colleges are doing for the country.” It believes universities should be assessed as engines of social mobility, supporting academic minds and scientific research that advance knowledge and drive economic growth, and inculcating/encouraging an ethic of service. It has also developed a ranking of community colleges. An older example is the Saviors of Our Cities: Survey of Best College and University Civic Partnerships, which measures “the positive economic, social, and cultural impact that institutions of higher education have upon the cities in which they reside.” It was followed by Metroversity Ranking. America's Best College Buys was originally published by Money in 1990; it is now published by Forbes as America's Best Value Colleges. It analyzes “how much a college should be expected to cost based on a number of factors.” Similarly, *Washington Monthly* created the Bang-for-the-Buck College Rankings.

Governments are asking similar questions. Concerns about student performance, affordability, and graduate success, alongside public/community engagement, have spurred considerable action around the world. These instruments are less concerned with rankings and more about accountability. Under the Obama administration, the US government linked access, affordability, and outcomes in a single tool called the College Scorecard. This is now being extended to place greater focus on individual programs rather than institutions. The United Kingdom has created the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) and the Knowledge Exchange Framework (KEF). The European Union has sponsored several initiatives seeking to capture engagement with/impact on civil society. In recent weeks, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation established the Post-Secondary Value Commission to gauge how well universities create value for students and contribute to economic opportunity for students.

DRIVING BEHAVIOR—BUT IN WHAT DIRECTION?

Instruments that raise wider questions about university public good are welcome. However, most effort is about economic impacts—how higher education meets the objectives of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency—rather than wider societal impact. This is partially because measuring cultural and societal impact or the value to public discourse through new ideas etc. is complicated. Yet, soft power, expressed through contribution to cultural institutions, democracy, international understanding, and overall society's value systems and policies, is equally powerful and can significantly influence a country's international standing with mobile investment and talent.

No doubt rankings drive behavior, but the direction of travel depends upon the choice of indicators. Governments and universities are not innocent victims: they have too often slavishly changed their policies and priorities to rise in the rankings for fear of falling behind their neighbor or competitor. BUT do the ranking organizations themselves bear any responsibility given that their real intent is to sell magazines and newspapers and/or consultancy? Indeed, despite their calls for greater transparency and accountability, their methodologies display very little. It is no longer good enough to only talk about universities' corporate social responsibility. Isn't it time we talked about the corporate social responsibility of the ranking organizations themselves? ■

Religion, a Major Driver for Forced Internationalization

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In an article published in *IHE* #97, "Forced Internationalization of Higher Education," the authors and Betty Leask show how policy makers can be "forced" to internationalize their higher education systems as a result of massive and unexpected arrivals of refugees (in today's world, 68.5 million people have become forced migrants—the largest forced displacement since the World War II according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR). While regular international students or scholars arrive equipped with sufficient sponsorship, well-document-

ed academic credentials, and foreign language proficiency, the drivers through which refugees access higher education in their host countries are untraditional. This article discusses how religion has become a strong driver for Syrian refugees' access to higher education in Turkey.

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION

Adopting an "open door" policy for people fleeing the conflict in Syria, Turkey is currently host to over 3.6 million Syrian refugees according to the UNHCR. The unceasing conflict in Syria and extended stay of the refugees in Turkey have "forced" the Turkish government to strategically internationalize higher education to ensure the "unexpected" and "seemingly permanent" Syrian refugees' access to universities.

First, no "selective" and "restrictive" credential evaluation procedure is taking place. While some of the universities admit Syrian refugees based on their secondary or (interrupted) postsecondary education's grade point average, others admit them without any requirement. Next, in order to overcome the language barrier, a free preparatory one-year Turkish language program is offered, and several universities have established study programs taught in Arabic.

Adopting an "open door" policy for people fleeing the conflict in Syria, Turkey is currently host to over 3.6 million Syrian refugees according to the UNHCR.

Last, Syrian students are exempt from paying tuition fees and provided with governmental scholarships. According to the Council of Higher Education (CoHE), these reforms have resulted in over 27,000 Syrian refugees enrolling in universities, which has made Turkey one of the countries hosting the highest number of refugee students in the world.

Getting into a university is highly competitive for domestic students in Turkey. Every summer, over two million candidates sit the university entrance test and very few can find a place at top public universities. Most have to enroll in private universities or in open education programs, or to re-sit the test the following year. In such a competitive context, the driver securing privileged access to Syrian refugees is based on a religious doctrine, the "Hegira."

According to the Islamic belief, the Hegira is the forced migration of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 as a result of persecutions by local people in Mec-

ca who denied his prophethood and attacked him and his companions. Prophet Muhammad and a group of his followers, the Muhajirs, were warmly welcomed in Medina by the local population, the Ansars. This displacement is considered to be a sacred journey by Muslims, who believe that the Prophet and his followers were forced into exile due to their Islamic belief and were protected by God during their journey and their arrival in welcoming Medina.

In March 2019, a cabinet minister declared that Turkey had spent almost US\$40 billion to cover the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Not surprisingly, increasing nationalism and economic instability in Turkey have led to a societal resistance against sharing limited public resources with Syrian refugees. With this in mind, the Hegira has repeatedly been used as a reminder by the Turkish government to justify the access of Syrian refugees into higher education. President Erdogan has defined Syrian refugees as “today’s Muhajirs” and Turkish society as “today’s Ansars.” Helping Syrian refugees, he argues, is a requirement for Muslim brother- and sisterhood, and he has ordered the CoHE to facilitate their access to universities. In a press release, the president of the CoHE shared his belief that being Ansars for Syrian refugees is a “divine will of God,” and he has promised to expand their access to universities in Turkey.

In a country with a conservative majority in power, ongoing economic recession, and highly competitive university admission, religion is thus a tailor-made driver that secures people’s understanding of the privileges granted to refugees with regard to access to higher education. This has successfully been implemented in Turkey and resulted in thousands of Syrian refugees enrolling in universities. The ruling party has performed in accordance with its conservative identity and Turkish society is behaving like Ansars, for the sake of Muslim brother- and sisterhood, in line with Islamic teaching.

CONCLUSION

In Europe, the emergence of nation-states transformed scholars from “cosmopolitan wanderers” into “citizens.” In the era of globalization, some scholars have become “global citizens,” while the fate of others is to be stateless refugees. The number of stateless refugees is increasing every day and these struggle to gain access to higher education in their host countries. It is obvious that their unintended inclusion among incoming international students will continue forcing policy- and decision-makers to walk a fine line between giving them access to higher education, and closely monitoring and managing the impact of this policy on public opinion.

What Works to Reduce Inequality in Higher Education?

KOEN GEVEN AND ESTELLE HERBAUT

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The full working paper on which this article is based can be accessed at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31497>

Graduating from college remains one of the best routes out of poverty. Recent research from Dr. Harry Patrinos (World Bank) shows that in most countries today, returns to higher education are now higher than those to lower levels of education. Women tend to have higher rates of return than men, and there is even some evidence (from the United States) that children from poor families benefit the most from higher education. So the question for policy makers is not *whether*, but *how* to help children from disadvantaged families get into higher education, and how to help them graduate.

The bad news is that in most countries today, large groups of disadvantaged students (e.g., low income, first generation, belonging to a racial or ethnic minority, as well as intersections between these groups) are unable to access higher education, even when they have the ability to do so. Another piece of bad news is that governments around the world do not seem to have very effective policies in place to target such groups (see Salmi, *IHE* #98). But there is good news as well: there is now a sizeable and high-quality body of literature that analyzes interventions and policies aiming to support disadvantaged students in higher education. In our new paper (World Bank Working Paper 8802), we rigorously selected, gathered, and compared over 200 causal estimates, from 75 (quasi-)experimental studies, of the effects of such interventions around the world. Four main lessons from this review can be applied by policy makers around the world.

POLICY MAKERS SHOULD TARGET SEVERAL MECHANISMS OF EXCLUSION

The first lesson is that there are different mechanisms driving exclusion and each of these can be targeted by different types of policies. One is that disadvantaged students have unmet financial needs to pay for college tuition (especially now that private higher education has soared), but they

also need to defer wages to pay for their living expenses, or have credit constraints in accessing support such as student loans. A second mechanism is the lack of academic readiness, since disadvantaged children (on average) have a less stimulating home environment, have access to schools of poorer quality, and do not have much academic support outside school. A lower level of academic readiness prevents students from being admitted to, or succeeding in, higher education. Thirdly, disadvantaged students lack information about the cost of college education, about its benefits in the labor market, and about existing financial aid schemes. Finally, students have various forms of cognitive bias that keep them away from college, such as present bias, cognitive overload, and routine or status quo bias. These biases may be more common among disadvantaged students who may not have a parent who keeps reminding them to read through college brochures, helps them to make strategic choices when applying to college, or takes them on campus visits. Identifying the mechanisms that cause underrepresentation among disadvantaged students is important, because different types of interventions may (and should) target different kinds of mechanisms.

Graduating from college remains one of the best routes out of poverty.

POLICY MAKERS SHOULD CONSIDER IMPLEMENTING MORE OUTREACH POLICIES

A second result of the review is that well-designed outreach interventions have large effects on enrollment rates of disadvantaged students. Outreach activities typically provide information and/or counseling to children in high school. A government may hire counsellors who strategically communicate with high school seniors about the returns to college, help them find the right degree program in the right subject, and keep them motivated all the way through graduation. These policies can target their lack of academic preparation, raise their aspirations, or just smoothen the transition from high school to university. We find that outreach policies are broadly effective in increasing access for disadvantaged students when they include active counseling or simplify the university application process, but not when they only provide general information on higher education. In other words, providing a video about the returns to college education is probably not enough to substantially help disadvantaged students. That being said, one paper

from China did find that information alone may be effective, so perhaps there is still more to understand about this, depending on the national context.

POLICY MAKERS SHOULD USE FINANCIAL AID MORE EFFICIENTLY

The third lesson is that there exists a wide variety of financial instruments to address unmet financial needs in higher education, including universal grants, targeted need-based grants, merit-based grants, performance-based grants, student loans, and tax exemption policies. We find that these policies are not equally successful at helping students. The good news is that we found that sizeable need-based aid shows very large and consistent effects on helping students to access and graduate from college. In contrast, we did not find consistent positive effects for small-scale need-based aid, merit-based aid, and tax exemption policies.

Another interesting finding is that a number of recent studies have shown that an early commitment for grant aid (when already known to students during high school) seems to be very effective at raising enrollment. Thus, the timing of the grant notification should be considered when designing financial aid schemes. Finally, we note that we still know very little about the effectiveness of loans, and thus this should be a priority for future research as loans are popular in policy making circles. While further evidence is being built, we would caution policy makers against creating complex loan schemes, as even current evidence about these is mixed.

RESEARCHERS SHOULD PRODUCE MORE EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

And, finally, there are many extremely impressive studies available and we expect the literature to continue to grow rapidly on this topic. An important caveat is that we found only five studies from low- and middle-income countries. This may have to do with our strict inclusion criteria (or human oversight). We are somewhat concerned about the external validity of our findings, although the broad mechanisms of exclusion are usually similar across countries. But low- and middle-income countries have some common peculiarities. For instance, in many countries, high schools are still concentrated in urban areas, and there are strong social norms that keep girls (and sometimes ethnic minorities) out of school. Together with other researchers, we hope to study these phenomena in the future to address this gap. Policy makers around the world will be keen to learn more about equity in higher education, particularly as demand is rising worldwide, with more children in school than ever before.

Quality and Equitable Access: Insights from Indonesia

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From the perspective of higher education (HE) systems experiencing massification, protecting teaching quality is no easy task. The obvious reason is historical underfunding. Most of the middle-income, emerging country contexts in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—where massification is occurring at rapid rates—must deal with the postcolonial legacy of underfunding and within-country inequality. Typically, a small number of elite state institutions have absorbed the bulk of resources available (such as the highest-educated staff, material resources, and donor aid). This means that quality has not been distributed evenly from the outset of higher education development. Secondly, there is the challenge of creating system-wide impact across a diverse sector. Massification in emerging economies has tended to rely on a large private sector to absorb demand. The quality of the private sector varies significantly, with some institutions exceeding the quality of state institutions, and others falling far short.

EQUITABLE ACCESS—THE MISSING LINK

For HE systems undergoing massification, a key challenge is also how to expand in a way that does not undermine fair or equitable access for students. The access consideration is also linked to the issue of quality. After all, what is the point of expanding access to HE for all groups in society, if they are not accessing an education that is of equal or meaningful quality? Until recently, however, quality and equitable access have often been discussed separately. This policy “blind spot” has fortunately been addressed in recent UN policy-making, most notably in the Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 4.3 now calls for “equal access ... to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education,” to be achieved by 2030. Put simply, governments must hold institutions to account over both their teaching quality and their support for equitable access. The big question now is how to achieve that in practice, especially in the emerging economy/massification context described above.

THE CASE OF INDONESIA

The case of Indonesia provides valuable insight here, as

its current HE policy framework addresses both teaching quality and equitable access. The key is an inclusive policy approach that involves both state and private higher education institutions (HEIs). This makes sense, considering that over 90 percent of HEIs in Indonesia are run as privately owned foundations, absorbing some two-thirds of enrollments.

Teaching quality is regulated at state and private HEIs in multiple ways. Minimum qualification requirements for teaching staff are set in law. HEIs are required by law to undergo accreditation every five years—at both institutional and degree program levels—at which point the results are ranked from A to C. A high accreditation ranking has tangible labor market value. Employers often require a qualification obtained from a B- or A-ranked institution in their selection criteria. Since 2012, accreditation rubrics have been made more rigorous by harmonizing them with the National Higher Education Standards. This is a form of curricular standardization, outlining common principles for teaching, research, and community service provision. Furthermore, up to 60 percent of curricular content is standardized in subject benchmarks of learning outcomes, devised with input from professional associations. Of course, low-quality or even outright fraudulent providers always

The law defines disadvantage on two grounds: low-income status and/or coming from one of the country’s most isolated and deprived districts.

remain a threat. The current accountability framework empowers the authorities to clamp down on this issue. To date, the ministry of research, technology, and higher education (MRTHE) has closed down tens of private providers and “frozen” operations at 243 institutions, blocking them from admitting new students before improvements are made. Authorities have even fired civil servants found guilty of using “pay-for-your degree” certificates. Meanwhile, a degree of flexibility is retained by granting institutions some autonomy over their curricula, enabling them to innovate and customize their teaching according to their academic/market niches, their institutional mission, and the needs and characteristics of their student intake.

Accountability also extends to equitable access. Higher Education Law 12/2012 Article 74 stipulates that HEIs must allocate 20 percent of their annual student intake to

students from disadvantaged backgrounds, to be distributed across the full range of study programs. This latter stipulation ensures that students from low-income backgrounds are not limited to low-cost or low-prestige degree programs. The law defines disadvantage on two grounds: low-income status and/or coming from one of the country's most isolated and deprived districts. To address the first criterion, the state now imposes means-tested tuition fees at all state HEIs. In other words, about a third of students in the HE system only pay what their families can afford. To address the second criterion, the state has introduced an affirmative action scholarship scheme targeting students from Papua and Aceh in particular (ADik Papua/3T).

To further boost participation for low-income students, the government introduced the merit-based and means-tested Bidikmisi scholarship in 2010. The MRTHE dispenses a set tuition fee contribution directly to the host institution, and a living stipend directly to the student. Accredited private HEIs are also eligible to participate in this scheme, as long as they demonstrate a minimum B-ranking at institutional and degree program level. Including trusted private HEIs in the scheme widens student access to high-quality and niche programs unavailable elsewhere. Some private providers have proven success in teaching hard-to-reach groups of students, which further aids equitable access. Of course, the scheme cannot be compared to a blanket study grant along the lines of financial aid packages offered in some European countries. In 2017, the *Bidikmisi* cohort reached 80,000 students, equating to roughly 15 percent of the state sector intake for the year, or 5 percent of the combined state and private sector intake overall. The number of applicants outstrips the quotas allocated each year. Clearly, there is still an unmet need for financial aid, but the scheme is at least a valuable start.

CONCLUSION

Of course, accountability of the HE sector cannot be resolved overnight, but Indonesia has at least made an impressive start. Whether this model can be replicated elsewhere is by no means clear. Arriving at the current policy framework in Indonesia was certainly a long and contested process. A policy U-turn in favor of protecting teaching quality and fair access across the whole system only came about after civil society protests, a protracted legal battle, the revoking of an earlier marketization law by the constitutional court, and disagreement between competing factions within government. Ultimately, though, Indonesia has defied the frequently espoused policy rhetoric about quality and equity being an "either-or" choice. Pursuit of one does not have to come at the expense of the other. The case of

Indonesia certainly offers a tempting proposition for other massifying, emerging economy contexts—might it be possible to have your cake and eat it too? ■

Post-18 Education and Funding in England

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This article is based on the Augar Review report, Independent Panel Report to the Review of Post-18 Education and Funding (UK Government, 2019), available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/post-18-review-of-education-and-funding-independent-panel-report>.

During the 2017 general election in the United Kingdom, the opposition—the Labour Party—proposed that higher education tuition fees should be abolished. Labour were rewarded with a better than expected election performance, especially from younger voters. The Conservative Party narrowly won the election. In a knee-jerk reaction, Prime Minister Theresa May in February 2018 commissioned Philip Augar, a banker and historian, to head up a review of post-18 education and funding. Its terms of reference, confined to England, were to “look at how we can ensure that the education system for those aged 18 years and over is accessible to all, is supported by a funding system that provides value for money and works for students and taxpayers, incentivizes choice and competition across the sector, and encourages the development of the skills that we need as a country.” The Augar Review’s report, *Independent panel report to the Review of Post-18 Education and Funding* was finally published in May 2019.

The Augar Report’s core message is the need to confront the disparity between the 50 percent of young people who participate in higher education and the other 50 percent who do not. Tackling this divide “is a matter of fairness and equity and is likely to bring considerable social and economic benefits to individuals and the country.” Does the report succeed?

HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING

Starting with the 50 percent in higher education (HE)—the “cared for.” The review represents the first official ex-

amination of the 2012 and subsequent reforms of higher education funding, which saw tuition fees rise to £ 9,250 per year, maintenance grants abolished, and typical student loan debt rise to £ 47,000 for a three-year undergraduate degree. The review is partly a response to increased debate around the cost and value of HE arising from these reforms and intensified scrutiny of the funding system.

The headline recommendations, and those attracting most attention, focus on HE student funding. They include reducing the maximum tuition fees HE institutions can charge from £ 9,250 to £ 7,500 per year, with the hope that the government will replace the lost tuition income by increasing HE institutions' teaching grant. But it is hard to see the government filling this funding gap, given all the other demands on its resources—potentially threatening the financial viability of teaching-intensive universities so reliant on tuition fee income. (The government has yet to formally respond in detail to the Augar Report's recommendations—it is preoccupied with Brexit.)

All undergraduate students qualify for government-backed student loans to cover all of their tuition fees, and 96 percent take out these loans. Consequently, students' loan debt would fall following Augar's suggested tuition fee reduction, but there are some stings in the tail. Currently, graduates do not have to start repaying their loans until

All undergraduate students qualify for government-backed student loans to cover all of their tuition fees, and 96 percent take out these loans.

their income reaches £ 25,000, with any outstanding loan debt being written off after 30 years. Augar recommends reducing the income threshold to £ 23,000 and extending the student loan repayment period to 40 years for new entrants from 2021–2022. Under these recommendations, students would graduate with less student loan debt, but they would have to start repaying their loans sooner and for longer, penalizing low-earning graduates. A clear bonus for low-income students is Augar's proposal to reintroduce maintenance grants of £ 3,000 toward their living costs, which would also reduce these students' loan debt. This change would address the current inequity of disadvantaged students graduating with higher levels of student loan debt than advantaged students because they can borrow more for their living costs.

However, the grants being proposed are far less generous compared to those available prior to their abolition in 2015. Of greater concern is the overall distributional effect on lifetime loan repayments of these and other recommendations. Compared to the current system, the highest earning graduates (predominantly men) would see their lifetime student loan repayments fall substantially. Middle earners (predominantly women, teachers, and nurses) would see the largest increase in repayments, and some lower earning graduates would also repay more. Such impacts are regressive.

Other recommendations include encouraging universities to “bear down” on low-value degrees and to incentivize the provision of courses better aligned with the economy's needs. The assumption that the “value” of courses can be measured by the size of graduates' salaries is overly simplistic and mechanistic, ignoring the wider benefits of HE.

FURTHER EDUCATION FUNDING

Turning to the 50 percent who do not attend higher education—the “neglected.” A distinctive feature of the review is its welcomed focus on further education (FE), the sector most akin to community colleges in the United States. The report concentrates on the institutional structure of the FE sector and recommends interlocking changes to its financial and regulatory framework, which it sees as fundamental to strengthening vocational and technical education. It highlights the decline in FE funding and falling student numbers, arguing: “Largely reflecting the collapse in learner numbers, total spending on adult skills has fallen by approximately 45 percent in real terms between 2009/10 and 2017/18. This is one of the most important statistics in this entire report and cannot be justified in terms of either economics or social equity.” The Augar Report recommends a much-needed additional £ 3 billion for FE colleges and other vocational training providers annually, as well as a one-off £ 1 billion capital funding boost. Furthermore, it proposes more comprehensive financial aid for students taking subdegree qualifications including lifelong learning loans. Ultimately, the new monies seek to rebalance the post-18 system so that FE is no longer the poor relation to HE and funding shifts away from universities toward FE and vocational training. Thus, the proposed freeze in the level of HE tuition fees and average per-student resource for three years is justified to help fund investment in FE. This extra funding for FE could have a transformative effect on this neglected part of the post-18 education sector and provide much needed alternative nonuniversity education and training opportunities. But should this be at the expense of HE? Should HE be pitted against FE?

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the Augar Report is a very mixed bag. It is thoughtful but limited. It contains much careful and perceptive analysis, but ignores its own evidence. Far bolder changes are needed to address the issues it seeks to remedy. The disparities between the 50 percent who attend HE and the rest are likely to continue. Fiscal constraints on Augar alongside a lack of vision have prevented it from being sufficiently holistic—from seeing post-18 education provision as part of a whole system serving all 100 percent rather than HE serving 50 percent and FE the other 50 percent. There is no conversation in the Augar Report about the relationship between FE and HE or between academic and vocational education. The benefits of its reform package are confined, it leaves major problems untouched, and it triggers new anomalies.

It is unclear if any of the Augar Report's recommendations will be implemented. The report's future is marred by the fact that the review was commissioned by the now ousted Prime Minister May. It is possible that the report's recommendations will be cherry-picked by the Conservatives or others in the years ahead. However, the newly appointed minister responsible for universities, Jo Johnson (the new prime minister's brother) was sacked by May because he did not support such a review. He criticized the Augar Report when published, saying that reducing fees to £7,500 will leave a funding hole the Treasury would not fill. Such changes, Johnson predicted, would destabilize university finances, reverse progress on widening participation, and mainly benefit higher earning graduates. "Bad policy, bad politics," tweeted Johnson. ■

International Graduate Outcomes in the United Kingdom

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UUKi's recently published report International Graduate Outcomes 2019 is available at <https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Pages/intl-graduate-outcomes-2019.aspx>.

The UK's freshly minted International Education Strategy sets a target for the United Kingdom to attract

600,000 international students by 2030, an increase of 30 percent. The UK government decision to launch this strategy is not unconnected with our decision to leave the European Union. While there have always been those in government who understand the enormous opportunities created by our popularity with international students, Brexit has focused minds on repositioning the United Kingdom globally. Suddenly, we have found that a much broader range of politicians were interested in the connections that we forge through hosting international students. Now, right across government, there is a sharper awareness of the benefits that international students and graduates confer, not only in economic terms, but in long-term positive influence on perceptions of the United Kingdom itself.

A very high proportion of graduates wanted to remain connected with their universities, including for the purposes of further study and research.

If we are to reach the new target, and return to significant growth in international student numbers, the United Kingdom needs to do two things. The first is sorting out our visa offer to ensure that the United Kingdom—like our competitors—offers an opportunity for international graduates to remain in the United Kingdom and work for a period post graduation. The second is to really understand, and where possible improve upon, the strength of our offer to prospective international students.

This context provided the impetus for Universities UK International (UUKi) to commission our recently published report *International Graduate Outcomes 2019* (i-GO).

THE APPROACH

UUKi commissioned I-graduate to survey international graduates of UK universities who graduated between 2011 and 2016. We enlisted the support of individual universities to contact their own alumni. As a result, we were able to gather responses from over 16,000 graduates of 58 UK universities based in 183 countries worldwide. We asked them a range of questions about their experience of studying in the United Kingdom, their careers to date, earnings, and desire to remain connected with the United Kingdom for the purposes of further study, research, business, professional reasons, or tourism.

The majority of respondents were medium-term graduates, between two and five years post graduation. But a significant minority (36 percent) were longer-term graduates

who were between five and seven years post graduation. The balance of respondents by nationality broadly reflected that of international students in the United Kingdom, with the largest group of respondents being from the United States, followed by China, India, Nigeria, and Malaysia. Interestingly, a significant proportion of respondents were currently residing in a third country, rather than the United Kingdom or their home country, illustrating the continued mobility of individuals who have been mobile for the purpose of study, and the extent to which a UK degree can provide a foundation for a global career. This was supported by the finding that 87 percent of respondents felt that they were more likely to do business internationally as a result of their UK degree.

KEY FINDINGS

The results of the study were strikingly positive. 82 percent of respondents said that their degree was worth the investment, with 69 percent believing that it helped them progress more quickly in their career than peers educated elsewhere, and a quarter stating that having a degree from the United Kingdom was the most important thing to their employer.

Over half (53 percent) of respondents believed that they earned above average or well above average compared to their peers. This self-reported earnings premium was corroborated by comparisons between earnings of responding graduates and available data for average graduate earnings in their home country. These comparisons suggest that, for example, the reported salaries of Chinese graduates were on average three times higher than the national average graduate salary for China, according to available data.

We found that, as we expected, a very high proportion of graduates wanted to remain connected with their universities, including for the purposes of further study and research. However, we also found that many expressed a desire to remain connected with the United Kingdom. Seventy-seven percent of respondents say they are more likely to do business with the United Kingdom; 81 percent want to develop professional links with UK organizations; and 88 percent plan to visit the United Kingdom for holiday or leisure.

These last findings are particularly helpful in making the case to the UK government to do more to attract and retain international students. Moves are already afoot to increase poststudy work opportunities. An extension of the current period from four to six months for undergraduates and master's students, and an automatic 12 months for those with PhDs has already been announced. Meanwhile the United Kingdom's recently reappointed universi-

ties minister, Jo Johnson, MP, led work in parliament to attract support for a proposed amendment to forthcoming immigration legislation. The amendment asks government to go further in its poststudy work offer for international graduates and received the backing of Boris Johnson and the UK's new Home Secretary Priti Patel.

LIMITATIONS, CAVEATS, AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

While this research highlights the advantages conferred on the United Kingdom by international students, and the advantages that a UK degree gives them in return, there is much more to do if we are serious about ensuring that there is a strong link between a UK degree and career success. UUKi is currently working on two fronts: expanding support available to companies who would like to take on international graduates through the provision of advice and guidance; and sharing good practice in careers support for international students. The latter topic will be the focus of UUKi's next research report, due to be published this autumn.

Finally, it is important to note that there are additional contributing factors to the outcomes of international graduates that the data in this study cannot wholly capture, including the financial, academic, and English language requirements that students must meet to study in the United Kingdom. Some of the graduates surveyed may have come from an already advantaged background—although, while we do not know the socioeconomic backgrounds of i-GO respondents, we do know that only 12 percent of them entirely self-funded their studies. It is likely that many international graduates who access higher education in the United Kingdom already have significant social and economic advantages that are likely to contribute to career success. For this reason, UUKi is taking a growing interest in the opportunities offered by online and other forms of transnational education in expanding access to those with limited opportunities to access high quality, international standard higher education. However, we know very little about the outcomes of students who study UK degrees abroad, an evidence gap that we must look to address as we develop international higher education for the future. ■

Why India Will Fail to Attract Global Faculty

PHILIP G. ALTBACH AND ELDHO MATHEWS

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It was reported recently that there are just 40 foreign teachers at all of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)—1 percent of the total faculty of 5,400—despite the government’s goal to attract 20 percent international faculty to the IITs. Internationalization in general, and the appointment of global staff in particular, is central to the new “Institutions of Eminence” program. The goal is even more lofty after the IIT Council last year recommended the recruitment of foreign faculty on a tenure basis. The Graded Autonomy Regulations of the University Grants Commission (UGC) now also allow the highest performing universities to hire up to 20 percent foreign faculty over and above the total sanctioned faculty strength on tenure basis.

It is virtually impossible for India to attract large numbers of international professors of high standing and ability without dramatic changes in many aspects of Indian higher education. This involves not only liberal funding with regard to salary and allowances, but also reforms in the existing governance structure in universities and changes in government regulations. For decades, the flow of academics has been in the opposite direction—from India to other countries. One can find top Indian talent, for example, at many American universities, employed as professors in many fields or in senior administrative positions such as university presidents or deans of schools—for example, the dean of the Harvard Business School and the dean of Harvard College.

TYPES OF PROFESSORS

There are two kinds of international academics to be considered. The first category is accomplished senior professors—these would be very difficult to lure to India. Established in their careers abroad, with attractive international salaries and often with family and other obligations, they are embedded both in their universities and locales. Some might be willing to have some kind of joint appointment in India if the conditions were favorable and their research interests were relevant to India. Recently retired academics might be attracted to an “Indian adventure,” but these scholars may no longer be productive researchers. The most realis-

tic possibility is academics of Indian origin (“non-resident Indians” or NRIs) who have successful careers abroad and might be attracted back. The main recent initiative of the Indian government in that respect, the Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN), has been successful in attracting many academics of Indian origin from different countries for shorter periods of time. However, the experiences of two prominent universities sponsored by Indian and other national governments—South Asian University in Delhi, sponsored by the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and Nalanda University in Bihar, sponsored by the country participants of the East Asia Summit—show that offering higher salaries (almost double those on offer to Indian academics, plus exemption from taxation) has not been a very successful strategy for attracting faculty of foreign origin, especially senior academics.

It is virtually impossible for India to attract large numbers of international professors of high standing and ability without dramatic changes in many aspects of Indian higher education.

The other group are younger scholars who may have fewer ties to their universities and local communities and are thus more mobile. Depending on their disciplines, some may have difficulty in locating a permanent academic job at home due to a tight academic job market. These academics are, of course, a greater risk since they may not be destined for distinguished careers. They may not add to the immediate prestige of the Indian universities that hire them since they do not have established reputations. However, they can provide quality teaching and research, and they often bring a useful international perspective. However, the experience of other countries that have hired young academics on the international market, for example Russia, is that many leave once they have built up research publications.

THE CHALLENGES

In some ways, the best Indian universities would require a kind of “cultural revolution” to join the ranks of global world-class universities—and to be able to lure top faculty. The structural and practical realities of Indian universities make them generally unattractive for academic talent from abroad. A few examples indicate some of the challenges.

- Indian academic salaries are not globally competitive, even taking into account variations in living costs. Senior academics at US research universities typically earn \$130,000 and up annually, and those at top US universities can earn \$200,000 or more. The average salaries for full-time academics is \$73,000, with those in high demand fields in the sciences, business, and others earning significantly more. In comparison, Indian salaries in the IITs, according to the latest Pay Commission recommendations, starts at \$17,622 for assistant professors, rising to around \$38,165 for full professors. Higher ranks earn somewhat more. China, which is also actively luring top international faculty to its research universities, offers salaries of \$100,000 or more, along with additional research funding.
- Indian public institutions have little experience in hiring international faculty and much experience with stifling bureaucracy. This means that processing academic appointments for foreign faculty is quite time-consuming, as approval by multiple government departments is needed in addition to standard university procedures. Indian public universities do not have processes in place to handle such appointments.
- International faculty cannot be offered long-term appointments in Indian public institutions. Five-year contracts are all that is available—although these may be extended. Thus, there is little job security.
- Obtaining research funding is difficult and the resources available, by international standards, are quite limited. The bureaucratic procedures relating to research grants are also daunting. This is in sharp contrast to China, where significant research funding is offered almost automatically to foreign faculty.
- Few IITs have considered foreign hiring as an important part of their academic initiatives. Premier institutions such as IIT Bombay now provides foreign faculty around \$1,500 as relocation allowance. Although a seed grant of up to \$29,000 is provided to new international faculty members to meet the initial cost for setting up a research laboratory, only around \$2,900 is provided as a Cumulative Professional Development Allowance (CPDA) every three years for presenting papers at conferences. In addition, political and security clearance from

the ministries of external affairs and home affairs are necessary in every case for individuals with foreign passports.

DIFFERENT STRATEGIES

On the other hand, a few “elite” nonprofit private universities such as O.P. Jindal, Azim Premji, Ashoka, Shiv Nadar, Ahmedabad, Krea, and the Indian School of Business have adopted different strategies, attracting foreign nationals and Indians who have studied at prestigious foreign universities by offering higher salaries and other benefits that are not available to local hires. The faculty diversity of O.P. Jindal Global University, which is located in the national capital region of Delhi, stands out with 71 full-time foreign faculty originating from 32 countries. The key motivation for hiring foreign faculty at all these institutions, mainly in liberal arts and professional courses such as engineering, management, and law, is to improve international competitiveness and secure positions in global rankings, which in turn should also attract more motivated students.

The measures taken by these new private universities with, by Indian standards, considerable resources have proved that it is possible to attract foreign faculty, at least those with an Indian ethnic background. But the challenges faced by public institutions, even those as high quality as the IITs and the best universities, seem insurmountable, at least in the context of the current Indian higher education environment and bureaucratic and legal framework. ■

Indian Research Universities and Global Rankings

PANKAJ JALOTE

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A more detailed report is available on the website of Current Science, May 2019 issue.

This century has seen a dramatic rise in the importance of global university rankings. In India, as in many other countries, there is a strong desire to have some of the nationally preeminent universities recognized among the best in the world. Currently, there are no Indian universities in the top 200 of the Academic Rankings of World Universities (ARWU, or “Shanghai ranking”), the *Times Higher Edu-*

cation (*THE*) rankings, or the QS rankings.

Global rankings largely depend on the research performance of a university, in particular on factors like publications, citations, PhD programs, and research income. Only top research institutions at the national level can hope to make it to the top 200. To find out whether some of the best research universities in India can make it to this group, we must identify the key characteristics of top global universities and understand how top Indian universities compare. (In India, top institutions include, in particular, the Indian Institutes of Technology [IITs], the Institute of Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Banaras Hindu University, and Jadavpur University. Specialized institutions in fields such as law, pharmacy, and management, would not be eligible.) When looking at the top 200 universities globally in the *THE* ranking and at the top 100 universities and engineering institutes in the new Indian national ranking (NIRF), three critical factors appear for both groups: age, size, and funding.

AGE

In *THE* rankings, the distribution of top institutions along different time periods is as follows: 135 were created in the nineteenth century when the Humboldtian model of research universities was spreading rapidly; 30 were created in the first half of the twentieth century; and only 38 were created after 1950, of which only 15 were founded after 1975.

In India, among the best institutions, only six were created before 1900, and only 17 were created in the first half of the twentieth century. In the quarter century after independence (between 1950 to 1975), 58 were established, including the five original IITs. The vast majority—119 in total—were created after 1975. In other words, whereas only 7 percent of the world's top universities were created after 1975, in India this is the case for about 60 percent; and while 65 percent of the world's top universities were created before 1900, only 3 percent of India's universities were established that early.

SIZE

In terms of size, among top universities worldwide, over 90 percent have more than 10,000 students (over 60 percent have actually more than 20,000 students), and only about 2 percent have a student population of less than 5,000. In terms of faculty size, only 6 percent have less than 500, while about 70 percent have more than 1,000. In India, on the other hand, only seven engineering institutions and 23 universities have more than 10,000 students, while about 60 percent have less than 5,000. In terms of faculty size, only four have more than 1,000, while over 80 percent have less than 500.

Large size leads to wider research scope and contributions, as well as interdisciplinary research. A large faculty body will also lead to more research, which increases the chances of high impact research. And a larger student population graduating each year implies that their contribution, impact, and influence on society are more significant.

FUNDING

With talented research faculty who have to be well compensated, research universities are costly to run. In support of their research, expensive research labs, high quality computing infrastructure, libraries, PhD students, travel support for conferences, etc. have to be provided, further increasing the overall expenditure per faculty. The average expenditure per faculty in universities ranked between 150 to 200 in *THE*—which is realistically the range that Indian universities can target—is about US\$0.5 million. The average R&D expenditure per faculty in US research universities with moderate research activity, according to the Carnegie classification of 2015, is about US\$32,000. (For universities with the highest research activity, the R&D expenditure is about US\$294,000).

The composition of the student body at private providers is distinct from the public sector in several respects.

In India, the expenditure per faculty in institutions at a corresponding level is less than US\$0.05 million, and the research grant per faculty is about US\$5,000. Even when considering the fact that manpower and some other costs are lower in India (though research equipment, international travel, digital library subscriptions, etc. cost the same as in other countries), this level of expenditure and R&D investment is significantly lower than in universities ranked 150–200 in *THE*, or at research universities in the moderate research activity category in the United States. For India's top higher education institutions to reach world rankings, investments in research will have to increase substantially.

CONCLUSION

The age, size, and funding profile of top Indian institutions is significantly different from that of the top global 200 universities. While nothing can be done about age, size and funding can be increased.

In order to expand the higher education system, the approach taken by India is to create new institutions, some-

times at a hectic pace. To be listed among top global universities, premier Indian institutions should receive support to become multidisciplinary and increase their number of faculty. If faculty at 50 research institutions (e.g., IITs and central universities) can be increased to more than 1,000, this could have an impact on global rankings. In addition, India could experiment with creating a few megainstitutions by merging existing universities, colleges, and research labs—an approach Australia took a few decades ago with remarkable success, and also pursued in France.

To enter world rankings, support for research will have to increase substantially. For this, two initiatives can help. First, top institutions could be provided with committed, multiyear research funding based on past performance—an approach that Australia and the United Kingdom follow with great results. Second, research project funding by agencies needs to increase dramatically and be accessible to all research universities—whether private or government. Many advanced countries invest over 20 percent of their public R&D expenditure in the university sector. In India, less than 4 percent of the government R&D expenditure goes to universities. The distribution of R&D funding must progressively move toward more support for research in universities.

It must be emphasized that sufficient size and funding alone will not automatically ensure a position in global rankings. In addition, universities in the top league will need to have strong systems to encourage and support high quality research, recruit the best talent and promote meritocracy, build a vibrant innovation culture, have strong leadership and governance, etc.

It should also be kept in mind that being in the top 200 globally is a zero-sum game. For an Indian institution to be in this group, a university currently at the top will have to drop out. As many countries currently are eager to be represented among this elite group, competition is every year getting tougher, and changes need to happen at a faster pace. ■

In cooperation with the American Council on Education, CIHE has published *International Briefs for Higher Education Leaders* no. 8 on Attainment and Inclusion in Higher Education. This annual brief was edited by Robin Matross Helms and Lucia Brajkovic from ACE and Laura E. Rumbley from the European Association for International Education, and contains 13 international perspectives and four case studies from different countries around the globe. It examines sustained efforts undertaken to ensure equitable opportunities for degree attainment for all students, including underserved or traditionally marginalized populations.

Concentration of Institutions and Urban Bias in India

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The massification of higher education is in general associated with improved access and reduced inequalities. Empirical evidence in India shows that the expansion of the system is accompanied by various forms of inequalities. Traditionally, the higher education sector in India has grown slowly, with low enrollment rates. This century witnessed a dramatic turnaround when the sector experienced accelerated growth leading to the massification of the sector. In 2017–2018, India had more than 900 universities, 41,000 colleges, 36.6 million students, and a gross enrollment ratio (GER) of 25.8 percent. Regional inequalities in higher education development have widened and social inequalities continue to be high, while gender inequalities are narrowing down. Based on a study conducted by the Centre for Policy Research in Higher Education at the National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (CPRHE/NIEPA), this article discusses some important features of concentration and urban bias in higher education development in India. This is relevant for higher education policy in this country and in other countries around the world with similar issues.

URBAN BIAS IN HIGHER EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

Any economic growth process produces concentration and diffusion effects. Concentration effects through unequal resource allocations lead to regional polarization. Diffusion effects, through their forward and backward linkages, result in spread development. Since knowledge economies rely on universities for knowledge production and the training of knowledge workers, a dispersed growth of universities help develop research capacities to support faster growth and a balanced regional development.

As in many countries, the development of higher education in India has an urban bias. The first group of universities were established in 1857 in the Presidencies (cities) of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The establishment of higher education institutions (HEIs) in the postindependence period also favored urban locations. The universities and HEIs established in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly in

urban or semiurban locations. The establishment of rural institutes and agricultural universities was an exception to this trend.

In India, there is a positive correlation between localities that are poorly endowed in terms of HEIs and low enrollment. In the 1970s, public policy paid special attention to the establishment of HEIs in rural, underdeveloped, and hilly areas to reduce rural–urban imbalances in higher education development. However, the proliferation of private HEIs (PHEIs) offset public initiatives to reduce regional inequalities. With the decline in public investment in higher education in the 1980s and onward, the private sector became active in establishing HEIs in urban and semiurban locations, especially in professional and technical subjects.

CONCENTRATION ON HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

The authors developed a concentration ratio measure to assess inequalities in the distribution of HEIs. This measure takes into account age group (18–23); total enrollments in higher education; number of institutions per region; average size of institutions; and GER.

Regional disparities in the distribution of HEIs have widened. For example, the number of institutions per 100,000 inhabitants varies from seven in Bihar to 56 in Telangana. While the number of HEIs have increased in all

Regional inequalities in higher education development have widened and social inequalities continue to be high, while gender inequalities are narrowing down.

states, the rates of growth vary. In other words, the increasing regional inequalities in the provision of higher education are due more to variations in the rates of growth of institutions than in an absence of growth.

In most states, the concentration ratio is positively correlated with the GER and inversely correlated with the average size of institutions. These findings imply that states with a high concentration of HEIs have larger institutions and higher enrollment in each institution. This is not surprising, given the high and positive correlation (0.84) between the number of HEIs and higher secondary schools whose graduates create increased social demand for higher education.

A further analysis indicates that states that have a higher share of private, unaided institutions also have a higher density of HEIs. The increase in the number of PHEIs has

contributed to an increased concentration of HEIs in the states. On the other hand, states that predominantly depend on public institutions have lower concentration of HEIs. These trends show that the market response to growing social demand for higher education is a reason for increased concentration of HEIs in urban areas.

The analysis based on 635 districts found that there is high concentration of HEIs in some districts compared to a low availability of HEIs in other districts. The analysis showed 17 districts without a single higher education institution and 191 districts with a very low concentration ratio—these districts must pay urgent attention to the need to open new HEIs. Fifty-four districts must establish general HEIs, 121 districts need technical HEIs, and 16 districts require both types. Right behind, some 293 districts are also in need of establishing HEIs to cover the needs of their populations.

UTILITY OF CONCENTRATION RATIOS

The overall conclusion from the analysis is that there is concentration of HEIs and an urban bias in higher education development in India. Nearly 75 percent of the districts are deprived of HEIs, either partially or fully. Establishing new HEIs in line with the prioritization indicated by the concentration ratio may help the country to level off existing inequalities in the provision of higher education and to reach a more balanced regional coverage. ■

The Internationalization Agenda of African Universities in the Next Decade

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The internationalization mission of African universities has evolved from initial failed attempts to more recent efforts to ground internationalization in the strategic vision of the institution. In this article, we review how internation-

alization should be approached by African universities in the next decade and how a greater focus on the third mission of universities, community engagement, could allow them to harness internationalization to enhance their capacity and make more contributions that are meaningful to the needs of their society and economy.

THE EARLY INTERNATIONAL MISSION

The concept of internationalization is not a new one for African universities. One of the main events following the establishment of universities in sub-Saharan Africa as independent countries in the 1950s and the 1960s was the UNESCO Conference on the Development of Higher Education, held in September 1962 in Antananarivo. One of the key topics discussed at that conference was “the national and international mission of an African university.” Back then, the conference recognized the benefits of internationalization for African universities as “increasing their chances of collaborating with other universities in Europe and in Africa as well as helping their students to have a world-class training which would enhance their ability to compete with graduates from across the world.”

In practice, however, the internationalization agenda of African universities was not fully pursued, chiefly because most postindependent governments pushed for the “Africanization” of university curricula and other key activities in the context of their nationalist agenda. It is only in the late 1990s that the concept of globalization became relevant for national governments. The emergence of the world university rankings after the launch of Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities in 2002 gave more meaning to the need for African universities to pursue an international agenda, explaining why it has become a core mission since then.

INTERNATIONALIZATION EFFORTS SINCE 2003

After 2003, universities in Africa began to develop an international mission and to establish offices of international programs for that purpose (for example, at the University of Ghana, the University of Ibadan, the University of Nairobi, and the University of Dar es Salaam). Initially, these offices were essentially in charge of coordinating the mobility of students and staff. They also worked with international donors to gain funding, for instance, for research centres.

In recent years, to improve on their internationalization efforts, African universities have given more importance and responsibilities to their offices of international programs by upgrading them: examples include Stellenbosch University, which has an office of the deputy vice-chancellor international, the University of Dar es Salaam with its “directorate for internationalisation,” and Kenyatta

University and its “centre for international programmes and collaborations.” These universities have expanded the duties of these offices to spearhead their advancement through closer engagement with alumni and foreign embassies (to secure cooperation with donors and universities in these embassies’ countries).

Since the early 2000s, when a number of universities in Africa began to develop their internationalization agenda, their efforts have yielded positive results in the research area. According to Web of Science data, the first 50 most-cited articles from top African universities in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania were in their majority coauthored with researchers from universities in industrialized countries. In addition, universities in Africa are now developing joint master’s and doctoral degrees with international partner universities.

Internationalization is not one-sided, with African universities always looking up to the West for collaborations, partnerships, and support.

Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that, while the internationalization agenda of most African universities in East, West, and South Africa have focused on North American and European universities in their linkages, traditional universities in South Africa (the University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, and the University of the Free State) have sought to internationalize by establishing African regional centres as a means to improve scholarship and regional development in Africa. For example, Stellenbosch University has set up the African Doctoral Academy, and the University of Johannesburg partners with regional bodies such as Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC).

Internationalization is not one-sided, with African universities always looking up to the West for collaborations, partnerships, and support. Universities and national governments, especially in Europe, fund cutting-edge research, postgraduate studies, and other university projects with African universities. An example is the German government’s WASCAL research program, which has created 10 graduate schools in West Africa, contributing to the education of the next generation of African scientists and policy makers in the field of climate change and land management. Accomplished faculty head research chairs at select African universities. For instance, Dr. Peter Weingart, a professor

emeritus of sociology and science policy at the University of Bielefeld, Germany, holds a South African research chair in science communication at Stellenbosch University.

In the past five years, a growing number of universities have articulated a clear internationalization strategy to improve their international collaboration efforts. For instance, the University of Nairobi, the University of Dar Es Salaam, and the University of the Free State have embedded their internationalization agenda into their new strategic plans. The University of Ghana underwent an international evaluation by the International Association of Universities to help improve its internationalization efforts.

WHAT IS LACKING IN THE INTERNALIZATION AGENDA

From the foregoing, it is evident that many African universities have reaped substantial benefits from their internationalization policies. However, flagship universities have difficulty when aligning their internationalization activities with their mission and vision and when seeking to contribute to national and regional development. Their internationalization agenda is not sufficiently focused on the science, technology, and innovation targets of regional bodies such as SADC and the African Union. International collaborations should be leveraged to fill capacity gaps and help African universities to increase their engagement with local and regional communities.

INTERNATIONALIZATION IN THE NEXT DECADE

In order to fully reap the benefits of their internationalization agendas established over the past two decades, African flagship universities need to evaluate the impact of these agendas in terms of accomplishing their vision and mission. A good example to follow is the University of Ghana, which has documented the lessons learnt and used them to develop a new internationalization strategy. Internationalization strategies should be fully aligned with African-wide and regional development plans for higher education.

African universities should seek to build strong partnerships with reputable regional research networks to improve their capacity to do research and publish in recognized journals. This would involve working closely with diaspora networks and connecting with African academics attached to universities in industrialized countries. In addition, internationalization should facilitate partnerships that can provide capacity building for good governance and leadership, with careful attention to transparency and accountability.

The internationalization agenda of African universities should not just follow a global trend, but be part of the institutional strategy and contribute to the overarching goals set out in the vision and mission of each institution. As such,

internationalization efforts must not remain hidden in internationalization offices, but be part of all major initiatives and operations of universities, with the full commitment and active participation of all academic actors. ■

Engaging the Ethiopian Knowledge Diaspora

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Despite the absence of precise data, there is a general consensus that Africa has a massive intellectual resource in its diaspora, which can help boost its effort to improve higher education. For instance, in 2012, the UN reported that, according to a conservative estimate, there were about 1,600 individuals of Ethiopian origin with doctoral level training in Canada and the United States alone; this number has no doubt increased since. Other popular destinations of the Ethiopian diaspora, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, and Australia, may present comparable cases. In contrast, at the very same time—in the 2011–2012 academic year—there were only about 1,100 Ethiopian academics with doctoral level training in the entire Ethiopian public higher education system (6.2 percent of the total teaching staff).

The contribution of the African diaspora in areas of knowledge and higher education has long been far below its potential. Among other things, two factors can help explain this inadequacy. First is the spiteful political relationship between members of the intellectual diaspora and repressive regimes in their respective home countries. This prevents the diaspora from engaging, particularly with public institutions. Second, there is no well-articulated diaspora engagement strategy and institutional support system that emphasizes knowledge and technology transfer. The limited engagements that exist remain informal and fragmented. The Ethiopian case mirrors the hope and despair of many African countries in similar situations, reflected in institutional frailty and a need for political reforms.

POLITICAL MOMENTUM

The nomination of a new prime minister in April of 2018 changed the dynamics of the relationship between the Ethiopian government and the diaspora. The new prime

minister traveled to several countries to meet the diaspora and held discussions with community representatives and organizations, thereby offering an open invitation to all to return home, including individuals and organizations that were formerly labeled as terrorist. In addition to subsequent reforms that created more space for the diaspora, one of the primary messages of the prime minister since taking office was a call, particularly, upon the knowledge diaspora to join forces in building the country. The response was overwhelmingly positive. The following three recent developments can illustrate this new momentum in engaging the Ethiopian knowledge diaspora.

In December, Vision Ethiopia, a diaspora organization founded and led by prominent intellectuals based in the United States, held its seventh conference for the first time in Addis Ababa. This is symbolic of the new spirit in the diaspora–government relationship in Ethiopia for at least two reasons. First, as the leaders of Vision Ethiopia are known to be among the top critics of the government, in the past years it would have been inconceivable to see these conferences held in Ethiopia. Most of the organizers and presenters at the last conference went back to Ethiopia after years in exile. Second, as the organizers later revealed, Vision Ethiopia received an encouraging level of support from the government, so much so that two ministers (the minister of science and higher education and the minister of culture and tourism) delivered remarks at the conference.

Over the past months, a number of representatives of diaspora organizations and networks visited Ethiopia and held discussions with government officials and representatives of academic institutions. Several of these organizations and networks also signed memoranda of understanding with the ministry of science and higher education, in an effort to chart a path for the engagement of their members with Ethiopian higher education. This development has also been matched by positive steps on the government's side. The newly established ministry of science and higher education has created an advisory council, where members from the diaspora account for a significant number. In addition, one of the subgroups within the advisory council is concerned with issues of diaspora engagement in science and higher education.

CHALLENGES

These developments, which are consistent with an increasingly positive environment for diaspora engagement across the continent, are not without challenges. One of the main ones is the imbalance in the disciplinary distribution of academics offering their support. While there are noteworthy initiatives in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), overall, compared to the de-

mand by local universities, engagement in these fields is very limited. There is relatively more support in the fields of social sciences and humanities. It is imperative to devise mechanisms to encourage more members of the diaspora in STEM fields to engage with institutions back home.

The lack of clear institutional and coordinating mechanisms is another challenge. The ministry of foreign affairs used to be in charge of all matters related to the diaspora. In a recent reorganization, an autonomous agency exclusively responsible for diaspora issues has been set up. However, the agency is at its early stages of human resources and organizational preparations and does not seem to be ready fast enough to tap into the current momentum by effectively coordinating activities across various institutions and stakeholders.

The contribution of the African diaspora in areas of knowledge and higher education has long been far below its potential.

This is compounded by the fact that universities, for the most part, do not have any articulated and streamlined approach to diaspora engagement. Most initiatives come from the diaspora's side and take place in a fragmented, case-by-case manner, depending more on personal connections than on institutional systems. The ministry of science and higher education needs to take the coordinating responsibility and, in partnership with universities, establish a policy and institutional framework to effectively engage the diaspora in the knowledge sector.

Here, it is important to acknowledge that the lack of stability and security, particularly in public institutions, is a serious impediment. Not only does this inhibit the diaspora from engaging, it also preoccupies the ministry, which remains in crisis management mode instead of focusing on strategic priorities.

Another layer of challenge, especially for those who have acquired the citizenship of other countries, is whether they should be treated as Ethiopians or as foreigners. This is an issue particularly in cases of longer-term engagement involving remuneration and other benefits. Indeed, Proclamation No. 270/2002 provides the legal framework for Ethiopian-born foreigners to be treated as Ethiopians. This, evidenced by acquiring an "Ethiopian-born" certificate, eliminates the requirement for visa and work permit. How-

ever, acquiring an Ethiopian-born certificate would raise the question of whether the individual shall be compensated as an Ethiopian or as a foreigner—in foreign or in local currency. Foreigners in Ethiopian higher education get paid at least five times as much as Ethiopian academics and receive their salaries in foreign currency. The absence of clarity on this issue has caused controversies.

In sum, the current wave of motivation and reforms create together a conducive environment to significantly scale up diaspora engagement in the knowledge sector. Not to lose momentum, swift strategic measures are needed to tap into its appealing potential. ■

China's English-Language Journals in Human and Social Sciences

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China has made some remarkable achievements in higher education during the past few decades. However, Chinese researchers in the humanities and social sciences (HSS) have achieved far less visibility within the international community than their peers in science, technology, and medicine (STM). The government recently stressed the significance of further internationalizing Chinese HSS in teaching, research, and in terms of sociocultural impact. Developing English-language academic journals is one of China's proactive initiatives to stimulate its HSS to go global. Based on face-to-face research interviews with 32 journal editors and on a thorough review of related policy documents at various levels conducted during 2017–2018, this article reports some of the main findings of an investigation on the current state of HSS English-language journals on the Chinese mainland.

A NATIONAL SCENARIO

By 2018, China had 66 HSS English-language academic journals, primarily hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, higher education institutions, and publishers. Compared with over 400 STM English-language journals and more than 2,000 HSS journals in Chinese language published in China, this is a modest figure.

These 66 journals cover a variety of academic subject areas, mostly in business and economics (17.26 percent), followed by eight (12 percent) in law, six (9 percent) in social sciences, four (6 percent) in education, and three (5 percent) in history. Thirty-seven (56 percent) have "China" or "Chinese" in their titles. While the earliest, the *Chinese Journal of Applied Linguistics*, was established in 1978, most of the journals were launched during the past two decades. Sixty (91 percent) were launched after 2000, 52 (79 percent) after 2006, and 34 (52 percent) after 2010. Many were established to answer the central government's policy calls for HSS to "go out," aiming at improving the international visibility of Chinese social research.

So far, the international impact of these journals has been extremely limited. Only six are indexed by the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and none by the Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI). Twenty-seven (41 percent) are indexed in Scopus (Elsevier's abstract and citation database launched in 2004). In 2018, in the SCImago Journal Rank (based on Scopus data with a scale of four quartiles), only three of the journals were ranked in the first quartile in their respective areas, while 11 were ranked in the second, three in the third, and 10 in the fourth. The underperformance of China's HSS English-language journals is due to a number of domestic and international factors.

DISADVANTAGES DUE TO INTERNATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASYMMETRIES

The humanities and social sciences, as institutionalized in universities throughout the world, are European in structure, organization, and concept. The American influence is particularly strong. Although increasing deterritorialized global flows are opening up possibilities for a pluralization of research imaginaries, the global structure of knowledge production is still largely hierarchical. The main disadvantages for HSS development in non-Western societies include the dominance of English, highly centralized means of knowledge dissemination—as demonstrated by international journals and publishers in global academic centers—and academic dependency on Western scholarship for ideas, theories, and methods.

Most editors report English as a major obstacle for their journals. They mention repeatedly that Chinese scholars, especially senior ones and to a lesser extent young domestic scholars and returnees, still do not have a satisfactory English writing ability. A large proportion of submissions from Chinese researchers are thus desk rejected. Further, the journals are hindered by their unfavorable positions in research evaluation systems. As rankings and league tables have become part of the global governance of higher education, China's domestic research evaluation system is

increasingly shaped by the Science Citation Index (SCI), SSCI, and A&HCI. Since the overwhelming majority of the HSS English-language journals are not indexed, it has been very difficult for them to attract international and domestic submissions.

The journals have encountered immense challenges in their attempt to internationalize. Only a small proportion have developed a fair understanding of what an international journal looks like and how to operate accordingly. In order to be better accessed internationally, 47 (71 percent) cooperate with international (Western) publishers, 11 (17 percent) with Taylor & Francis Group, nine (14 percent) with Brill, and eight (12 percent) with Springer. While several editors acknowledge the brand effect brought by international publishers, most say that even after years of partnership, the quality and impact of their journals have rarely improved. Some even worry about the financial pressure caused by the high cost of the partnership and its possible impact on the sustainability of their journals.

Most editors report English as a major obstacle for their journals.

DILEMMAS BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

All the HSS English-language journals with relatively higher achievements in international visibility are struggling to strike a balance between international ambition and local commitment. The editors demonstrate a clear awareness of the Western, especially Anglo-American, hegemony in global knowledge production. They report a lack of understanding of—and even misunderstandings about—China and China’s social research in international academia. The journals are therefore perceived as a platform for bringing Chinese scholarship to the outside world and facilitating multiple perspectives and mutual understanding in global HSS research.

However, hoping to be better recognized internationally, most of them make great efforts to include international scholars among their editorial board members, reviewers, and authors. The intention to have a larger international readership is desperate. Although many respondents are concerned about “overinternationalization” and “losing academic relevance to local society and autonomy,” most journals in the social sciences set entry into SSCI as their current strategic goal. While SSCI and A&HCI are not des-

ignated as major targets in the humanities, the journals in these disciplines seek in a similar way to orient themselves toward the “golden standards” set by Western practices in order to enhance their international recognition.

Editors confirm the lingering difficulties in the dialogue between Chinese and Western scholarship. As an editor at *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* expressed, “We’ve translated and published articles written by leading Chinese scholars, but they have almost zero download, much lower than those written by younger Chinese diaspora members.” This reflects the global position of China’s HSS research. Issues such as lack of original theoretical contributions, catch-up mentality, overpragmatism, and academic nationalism have exerted a combined impact on HSS research in China, leading to a limited contribution to the dialogue with international scholars.

CONCLUSION

Confronted with challenges and dilemmas, China’s HSS English-language journals are still at a preliminary stage of development. With strong support from the state, institutions, and individuals, they are well positioned to contribute to the dialogue between Chinese and international HSS scholars. As the wider contexts change locally and globally, they are required to adjust their agendas and priorities, and recontextualize their themes, concepts, and paradigms. Such adjustment takes time. More fundamentally, they need to balance realistic strategies to enhance international impact with orientation to Western research agendas and their long-term commitment to empowering Chinese HSS researchers to become global. ■

World-Class Universities and Institutional Autonomy in China

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This article is based on a Scholars at Risk’s report entitled Obstacles to Excellence: Academic Freedom and China’s Quest for World-Class Universities, available on SAR’s website at <https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/>.

Once a hallmark of the higher education competition phenomenon of the twenty-first century, the

term “world-class university” now evokes a more specific thought: China. Though how that is interpreted varies widely, as China’s accelerated quest for institutional excellence is often at odds with the core higher education values that assure quality. Particularly at risk among these values are academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Academic freedom has occupied considerable space in recent literature and debate not merely regarding the case of China, but globally—and rightly so. Yet while academic freedom is in part contingent upon institutional autonomy (described by UNESCO as “the institutional form of academic freedom”), less frequently is it discussed in such terms, nor does it receive the global scrutiny it deserves.

OBSTACLES TO EXCELLENCE

With the forthcoming release of *Scholars at Risk’s (SAR) Obstacles to Excellence: Academic Freedom and China’s Quest for World-Class Universities*, institutional autonomy ascends to the fore. Based on interviews with Chinese and international sources familiar with Chinese higher education; data from the SAR’s Academic Freedom Monitoring Project; legislative and regulatory texts; statements by government officials; and reporting and research by human rights organizations, academia, and the press, *Obstacles to Excellence* seeks to raise awareness of academic freedom and autonomy-related pressures, and offers recommendations for governments, higher education communities, and civil society in China and around the world.

While US higher education faces decreased public investment and support, the People’s Republic of China has intensified its investment toward excellence, evident in the National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development and various initiatives that came before. In the case of China, however, increased national investments in higher education often outpace respect for academic freedom and institutional autonomy. In *Obstacles to Excellence*, threats to institutional autonomy and academic freedom are traced across Mainland China—from Beijing and Shanghai to the minority regions of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions, to Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions; through Sino–foreign higher education joint ventures in China to Confucius Institutes abroad; and extend to the enigmatic grasp of the long arm of the Chinese party-state.

SWEPT UNDER THE RANKINGS RUG

In China’s pursuit to transform its institutions into world-class universities, global rankings have offered metrics to purported advancement. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has allocated significant funding to implement programs such as the 211 and 985 Projects to bolster the reputation of key universities. The most recent incarnation,

the 2017 Double World-Class University Project, aims to establish 42 world-class, research-driven universities and 465 world-class disciplines by 2049.

China’s investments have helped enable a growing share of its institutions to rise through world university ranks. Yet its dogged commitment to ranking systems, frequently criticized for failing to adequately factor considerations of academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and other core higher education values, is cause for concern. The fixation on rankings shifts the incentives for institutions to focus on quantity rather than quality-based outputs at the helm of future funding. What China’s rise amidst its fault lines signals for higher education everywhere is that in an era of market-based competition and the ranking systems that sustain it, institutional autonomy, like academic freedom, may be increasingly vulnerable. What remains to be seen is if the very system that propelled China’s rise—a centralized, state-centered, and controlled system—is what foreshadows its descent.

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STATE DISCRETION ON THE VALUE OF THOUGHT

World-class universities are often described by their ability to address the world’s most vexing challenges through disseminating responsive and disciplined knowledge, but the world-class university as a world-class knowledge producer operates within a set of limitations. For China, these limits are at the discretion of the state. As detailed in *Obstacles to Excellence*, impediments to academic inquiry and expression manifest themselves through restrictions on internet access (China’s “Great Firewall”), pressures on scholars and students who stray from established orthodoxies, vetting and censorship of foreign publication imports, and restrictions on academic travel, to name a few.

A notable development in Chinese party-state interference concerns a rallying of efforts to ensure that knowledge and ideas within the university align with those of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP’s increased efforts to root party ideology at the center of China’s educational foundation are evident in the development of “Xi Jinping Thought Centers.” With the 2017 announcement of Xi Jinping Thought enshrined in the constitution, many universities swiftly established aspiring centers where critics fear

that opportunities for funding will dismiss—if not silence entirely—academic work outside party ideology. Perhaps more chilling is the 2013 leak of an internal CCP directive called “Document Number Nine,” which outlines seven topics allegedly banned within universities and related sectors, including universal values, civil society, a free press, and questioning China’s governance. While there is little public information on the ban’s implementation, it echoes reports of a common understanding of what is off-limits, including “the three Ts”—the autonomy of Tibet, Taiwan’s status, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. The CCP’s policing of these and other ideological constraints is evident in part by so-called “student informants,” who report controversial comments or teachings to party and university officials, often resulting in severe disciplinary actions against professors.

Unsurprisingly, with impediments to free inquiry and autonomous governance, many Chinese scholars have had to choose to either abandon their country or their academic profession altogether. In other cases, academics have been wrongfully detained, arrested, and prosecuted. The trend has extended to students, with an uptick of reports of repression on the mainland. It is alarming that censorship and repression are occurring in China with increased frequency within Chinese higher education, through enhanced methods, and enshrined in law, as enormous effort is applied to achieve a reputation as a world-class knowledge producer.

SAR’s *Obstacles to Excellence* challenges the current metrics in rankings to take academic freedom and institutional autonomy into consideration. Likewise, it urges China and the global higher education community to position institutional autonomy as a bedrock of academic freedom and quality universities. Embracing and committing to these values will help China cultivate truly world-class universities from which everyone benefits. ■

Reforms in France: When Competition and Cooperation Clash

CHRISTINE MUSSELIN

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Many studies show that cooperation among competitors may have positive effects. But, sometimes, competition and cooperation clash. The reforms of the French higher education system are an interesting case for exploring this issue as they increased the level of competition, but also favored cooperative consortia of institutions at the local level.

MORE COOPERATION...

For many years, the institutional divide between universities, *grandes écoles*, and national research institutions has been a recurrent concern for political actors. In order to overcome this institutional divide, the 2006 law on research and innovation made it possible for higher education institutions to form local consortia called PRES (higher education and research “poles”) and to develop common activities. Beginning in 2007, a number of PRES projects were selected and received funding. But, that same year, a new act increased the autonomy of French universities. The appetite of university presidents for PRES decreased: with increased margins for maneuver at the university level, most became reluctant to transfer powers to the PRES. The latter were maintained but were not very active: some common doctoral schools were created at that level, but universities kept other responsibilities under their own roof.

This situation evolved after the election of François Hollande to the French presidency in 2012. The new minister of higher education and research strengthened the policy for local cooperation: the PRES became COMUE (Community of Universities and Institutions) and, as a result of the 2013 act, every higher education institution must now be part of a COMUE and transfer some powers to that level. The role of the COMUE is to develop cooperation among its members, such as managing COMUE doctoral schools, creating COMUE research labs, asking all academics to include the name of the COMUE in their signature, etc. COMUEs should also define a higher education and research policy on their territory and sign a five-year contract with the ministry, replacing contracts with each individual



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institution. The idea behind the COMUE was also to simplify the French higher education landscape: the map of a COMUE looks very much like a *jardin à la française*, compared with the fuzziness of universities and *grandes écoles*. With their larger size, the consortia were also expected to be more visible on the international scene.

...AND MORE COMPETITION

While these policies aimed at developing proximity-based cooperation, others aimed at identifying the best institutions, rewarding (mostly research-based) performance, and enhancing differentiation.

This was a major change. Of course, competition already existed, but the French university system relied nevertheless on a principle of national equivalence. Everybody knew that this was not actually the case, but the ministry was expected to guarantee this principle of equivalence. With the reforms of the 2000s, the discourse changed: they wanted to allocate more resources to the best institutions. Highly selective national calls for projects were launched: the call for the creation of PRES or for scientific networks

While these policies aimed at developing proximity-based cooperation, others aimed at identifying the best institutions, rewarding (mostly research-based) performance, and enhancing differentiation.

(RTRA, advanced thematic research networks), the Plan Campus that funded new buildings linked to innovative scientific projects, and finally the multiple calls of the Investment Program for the Future (PIA), which invested EUR 27 billion into higher education and research. One of the many instruments of the PIA—the IDEX (“initiatives of excellence”)—sought to identify “excellent institutions,” with the goal of selecting 10 IDEX that would receive funding from an endowment upon a favorable evaluation after four years. Up to now, four IDEX have been confirmed and six are still being assessed, while one has been discontinued.

INTERFERENCES BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION

These two reform streams raised contradictions. One of the main issues about the competition schemes was whether universities and/or consortia should compete with one another. In 2007, while the ministry increased the autonomy of French universities, it launched the Plan Campus for

which only the PRES—not individual universities—were allowed to apply. This was reinforced with the call for IDEX. After a fight for influence between the ministry and the agency in charge of the PIA, it was decided that only PRES (later COMUE) could apply for an IDEX. Therefore, from the very beginning, IDEX developed in a tension between two logics: a purely scientific logic pushed by the agency and aimed at identifying the best institutions, and an institutional logic pushed by the ministry and aimed at overcoming the institutional divide.

This institutional logic impacted the results of the competition for IDEX. The three first IDEX set the tone, with the jury favoring projects based on mergers. Some consortia with excellent scientific potential were not selected because the governance of their projects was not integrated enough. For the following calls, all projects proposed a more integrated governance and a merger mania began: nine mergers have now already occurred, involving 25 institutions, and three more involving 16 institutions are due by January 2020.

These calls for IDEX highlight some of the contradictions that arose. Cooperation does not come easily between universities and *grandes écoles*. Up to now, mergers have mostly involved universities because their culture, the status of their personnel, their salaries, etc. are very different from *grandes écoles*. Furthermore, most *grandes écoles* are afraid of having to submit to the rules, practices, and culture of the much larger and powerful universities in their COMUEs. The institutional divide remains very strong.

COMUEs where members have received the status of IDEX have become weaker, and their relationship with these members is strained: the winners are not ready to share their IDEX funding with other members of the consortium and, in terms of cooperation, they prefer working with their (generally not local) scientific counterparts. COMUEs without IDEX also suffer from increased competition, as their strongest members in terms of scientific reputation prefer running independently and so reduce their cooperation with the consortium to a minimum. Furthermore, these COMUEs have nothing attractive to offer, as they receive no extra funding from the state.

This reflects the contradictions between proximity-based cooperation, on which COMUEs rely, and status-based cooperation, on which scientific networks rely. As a result, many COMUEs are about to dissolve or to be redesigned: with the current government, COMUE members are allowed to rethink their status and the way they are run, or to be transformed into a rather loose association of institutions. ■

NEW PUBLICATIONS

(Editor's note: We welcome suggestions from readers for books on higher education published especially outside of the United States and United Kingdom. This list was compiled by Jean Baptiste Diatta, graduate assistant at CIHE.)

- Alam, Firoz, and Alexandra Kootsookos. *Engineering Education: Accreditation & Graduate Global Mobility*. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. pp. 300. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/Engineering-Education-Accreditation--Graduate-Global-Mobility/Alam-Kootsookos/p/book/9780815396017>
- Al-Issa, Ali, and Seyyed-Abdolhamid Mirhosseini, eds. *Worldwide English Language Education Today: Ideologies, Policies and Practices*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. pp. 176. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/Worldwide-English-Language-Education-Today-Ideologies-Policies-and-Practices/Al-Issa-Mirhosseini/p/book/9781138599185>
- Anderson, Vivienne, and Henry Johnson, eds. *Migration, Education and Translation: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Human Mobility and Cultural Encounters in Education Settings*. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. pp. 256. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/Migration-Education-and-Translation-Cross-Disciplinary-Perspectives-on/Anderson-Johnson/p/book/9780367260347>
- Brewer, Elizabeth, and Anthony C. Ogden. *Education Abroad and the Undergraduate Experience, Critical Perspectives and Approaches to Integration with Student Learning and Development*. NAFSA Sterling, VA, Stylus Publishing, 2019. pp. 295. Website: www.Styluspub.com.
- Carpenter, Scott. D., Helena Kaufman, and Malene Torp. *Integrating Worlds, How Off-Campus Study Can Transform Undergraduate Education*. Sterling, VA, Stylus Publishing, 2019. pp. 187. Website: www.Styluspub.com.
- Castro, Paloma, Ulla Lundgren, and Jane Woodin, eds. *Educational Approaches to Internationalization through Intercultural Dialogue: Reflections on Theory and Practice*. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. pp. 256. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/Educational-Approaches-to-Internationalization-through-Intercultural-Dialogue/Castro-Lundgren-Woodin/p/book/9780367001469>
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- Coelen, Robert, and Cate Gribble. *Internationalization and Employability in Higher Education*. Series Internationalization in Higher Education. London and New York, Routledge, 2019, pp. 261. Website: www.routledge.com/education.
- Corcoran, James N., Karen Englander, and Laura Mureşan, eds. *Pedagogies and Policies for Publishing Research in English: Local Initiatives Supporting International Scholars*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. pp. 300. Website: <https://www.crcpress.com/Pedagogies-and-Policies-for-Publishing-Research-in-English-Local-Initiatives/Corcoran-Englander-Muresan/p/book/9781138558090>
- Deane, Neubauer, E., Mok Ka Ho, and Edwards Sachi, eds. *Contesting Globalization and Internationalization of Higher Education: Discourse and Responses in the Asia Pacific Region*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018. pp. 169. Website: <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030262297#aboutBook>
- Dyson, Sue, and Margaret McAllister, eds. *Routledge International Handbook of Nurse Education. Local Initiatives Supporting International Scholars*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. pp. 424. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-International-Handbook-of-Nurse-Education/Dyson-McAllister/p/book/9780815358862>
- Gallacher, Jim, and Fiona Reeve, eds. *New Frontiers for College Education: International Perspectives*. New York, NY: Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. pp. 238. Website: <https://www.routledge.com/New-Frontiers-for-College-Education-International-Perspectives-1st-Edition/Gallacher-Reeve/p/book/9781138307698>
- Hayes, Aneta. *Inclusion, Epistemic Democracy and International Students: The Teaching Excellence Framework and Education Policy*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018. pp. 181. Website: <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030114008>
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- Li, Jian. *Global Higher Education Shared Communities: Efforts and Concerns from Key Universities in China*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018. pp. 190. Website: <https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811377624>

NEW PUBLICATIONS FROM CIHE

Godwin, Kara A., and Hans de Wit, eds. 2019. *Intelligent Internationalization. The Shape of Things to Come*. Global Perspectives on Higher Education, volume 43. Leiden, Boston: Brill/Sense, www.brill.com/gphe. This book is a rich collection of essays on the internationalization of higher education, written by over 40 scholars and practitioners in the field from a broad range of countries on all continents. It was compiled on the occasion of Laura Rumbley's farewell as associate director and assistant professor of the practice at the Boston College Center for International Higher Education (CIHE), and her transition to a newly created position as associate director of knowledge development and research at the European Association for International Education (EAIE), in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

De Wit, Hans, Laura E. Rumbley, Daniela Craciun, Georgiana Mihut, and Ayenachew Woldegiyorgis. 2019. *International Mapping of National Tertiary Education Internationalization Strategies and Plans (NTEISPs)*. *CIHE Perspectives 12*. Center for International Higher Education, Boston College, www.bc.edu/cihe. This issue is the second report commissioned by the World Bank. The first one, *CIHE Perspectives 1* (2016), sought to map the landscape of international advisory councils (IACs) at tertiary education institutions around the world. With this second report, the World Bank and CIHE en-

visioned another mapping opportunity, in this case to gauge the scope of National Tertiary Education Internationalization Strategies and Plans (NTEISPs) in several low- and mid-income countries.

Schendel, Rebecca, Lisa Unangst, Jean Baptiste Diatta, Tessa DeLaquil, and Hans de Wit, eds. 2019. *The Boston College Center for International Higher Education Year in Review, 2018–2019*. *CIHE Perspectives 13*. Center for International Higher Education, Boston College, www.bc.edu/cihe. This publication is the third in our series of yearbooks, which present our key activities from the year, along with a collection of articles from our graduate students, research fellows, visiting scholars, and staff.

Currently, CIHE is finalizing several other publications based on projects undertaken over the past period. A SAGE book on *Global Trends of Doctoral Education*, edited by Maria Yudkevich, Philip G. Altbach, and Hans de Wit. *CIHE Perspectives 14* with the proceedings of the WES-CIHE Summer Institute, June 2019. And three Brill/Sense publications: *Global Phenomenon of Family Owned and Managed Universities*, edited by Philip G. Altbach, Edward Choi, Mathew Allen, and Hans de Wit; *Refugees and Higher Education*, edited by Lisa Unangst, Hakan Ergin, Araz Khajarian, and Hans de Wit; and *Corruption in Higher Education*, edited by Elena Denisova-Schmidt.

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